As the Chinese navy continues to expand its fleet of aircraft carriers, the United States is finally facing the threat of other countries’ carriers for the first time in over half a century. Regarding how to deal with Chinese carriers, there is a plethora of opinions within the US, with one seemingly reliable approach being to counter China’s carriers. Unfortunately, despite the ingenious strategies proposed by US experts, it is highly likely that they will fail to materialize due to the inherent shortcomings of the US military.
On April 15th, an article by Brandon J. Weichert published in The National Interest discussed China’s rapid development of aircraft carriers and the simultaneous construction of an effective anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) system capable of defending against US aircraft carriers. It raised the question of how the US and its military should respond to this country preparing to venture into the open ocean.
Weichert first pointed out that the China’s simultaneous development of carriers and anti-carrier weapons appears paradoxical, providing a reference for countering PLA carriers. Despite the US government’s efforts to strengthen relations with Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, the Philippines, and other countries in an attempt to restrain or deter the PLA, Weichert believes that these countries are unlikely to hinder China. The only effective counterforce against the PLA, according to Weichert, is the US military itself. However, even with the prowess of the US military, there needs to be a strategy. Weichert suggests that the US should replicate China’s A2/AD strategy in Asia, although calling it replication might be too polite.
To be blunt, it’s a call for the US military to directly mimic the China’s A2/AD tactics and utilize the geographical advantage of countries like Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines to block China’s carrier battle groups within the first island chain. Given the operational characteristics of carriers, if the PLA’s carrier threat cannot be eliminated within the first island chain, the potency of the US carrier fleet will be neutralized. Why might this be the case? Because China has two advantages: its island-building activities in the South China Sea, which not only effectively control the area but also enhance the effectiveness of its A2/AD strategy, weakening the influence of neighboring countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines.
The second advantage lies in the China’s superiority in hypersonic weaponry, where China’s technological edge balances out some of its shortcomings against the US, such as fewer carriers and smaller carrier-based aircraft. However, as typical of leading Americans, Weichert hesitates to acknowledge the US’s lag in hypersonic technology. He even brings up Japan and India, suggesting that these countries have made astonishing progress and can join the US in countering the PLA.
Overall, the idea of replicating the China’s A2/AD tactics isn’t necessarily wrong; after all, offense and defense have always been relative in warfare.
The proposition by US experts to use Chinese tactics against carriers to counter Chinese carriers, whether from a military or methodological perspective, or even from a mechanistic standpoint, isn’t just a view held by Weichert. Even in the US government and military hierarchy, which is sometimes seen as sluggish, there’s no shortage of individuals with enough strategic and tactical insight to recognize the threat posed by the PLA. The genius at the top of the US military doesn’t mean that the mid-level and grassroots levels lack foresight. If the US military intends to mimic the PLA’s A2/AD tactics, they may not even be able to take the first step.
Firstly, considering the current situation of the US military, if they intend to block Chinese carrier battle groups within the first island chain, they primarily rely on themselves, despite needing cooperation from countries like Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, and the Philippines. Especially with the Marine Corps undergoing downsizing reforms, they need to be stationed on various islands along the first island chain before the war, waiting for opportunities to attack China’s fleets approaching the islands. The problem is that this would scatter the Marine Corps, making effective command and control and mobility of the so-called distributed operations two major challenges. It’s difficult to coordinate scattered troops effectively. Once communication facilities are destroyed or mobile platforms can’t provide support in time, these soldiers fighting independently would either surrender or wait to be picked off by the PLA, leading to their own demise.
Secondly, for the US military to replicate tactics along the first island chain means involving many countries in East Asia and Southeast Asia in the war. Considering the current situations in Ukraine and Israel, it’s unknown whether these countries have the determination to join the war. Moreover, it’s essential to understand that the US is separated from these countries by half the globe, while China is only a few hundred to a few thousand kilometers away, with missile forces capable of striking at any moment. It shouldn’t be difficult to understand which side these countries would likely stand on temporarily, to avoid harm and seek benefits.
Lastly, even if the first two problems are overcome, whether the US Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps can obtain enough hardware, including various types of weapons and ammunition that meet requirements, is still a significant issue. Especially for the Marine Corps undergoing downsizing and transformation, how many years will it take to complete the production and equipping of required anti-ship missiles, transportation, landing ships, and logistical support facilities? Under the hollowing out of American manufacturing, even if they can be produced, the US military has projects clamoring for funds everywhere. The US Air Force needs to buy more stealth aircraft and missiles, the US Navy is eager to use money to build new nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers, and the US Army wants funds to update its long-range strike system. As the lowest-ranking branch, how many dollars can the Marine Corps receive to equip battalions likely to be annihilated in battle after the war starts, let alone weapons and equipment? Ultimately, this is just wishful thinking.
If the US really intends to mimic the China’s tactics, they face numerous real-world problems. The issue isn’t that the US lacks the capability but that its existing colossal operational system wasn’t initially designed to counter carriers like the China’s, hence the current predicament. With such a complex operational system, it’s not easy to overturn it, let alone partially modify it. After all, it’s hard to turn a large ship around. The US is now like a giant ship heading towards a reef; it can only try to navigate through the difficult waters while desperately seeking a way to change course. (Wang Yanan)
