Author: talvez
The criticism of American-style isolationism from China does not represent true isolationism in its essence. Meanwhile, China’s cosmopolitanism is built upon primitive mercantilist principles, lacking the necessary intervention mechanisms to realize genuine globalism.
The transition from being an economic power to a world power requires one essential condition: events occurring in any corner of the globe must be tied to one’s national interests. Without this connection, it is impossible to become a true global power, nor will other nations genuinely respect you. This is the crux of the issue.
China has consistently adhered to the idea of focusing on managing its own affairs, believing that everything else will naturally fall into place. This may be a deeply ingrained notion. However, such a belief risks conflating the distinction between sufficient and necessary conditions. Like dust accumulating in a house, if not regularly cleaned, it will pile up over time; expecting dust to disappear on its own is nothing short of wishful thinking.
The configuration of global power dynamics inevitably rests on the foundation of a balance of strength, a principle that is universally acknowledged and clearly understood by China. Thus, China has employed various methods to stimulate economic growth and enhance its comparative strength. However, this mindset remains rooted in the framework of a commercial power, equating economic strength with national strength—or even conflating commercial power with national power. This perspective may lead to a critical misstep, as robust economic strength does not automatically translate into national power.
The growth of China’s economic strength has gradually approached its limits, indicating that the country’s economic expansion must now intertwine with geopolitical interests. China’s advocacy for a new cosmopolitanism reflects an acknowledgment of this reality, but it has yet to translate this concept into concrete action. Without exception, if China wishes to avoid a passive drift into isolationism, it must first refrain from self-imposed limitations and break away from rigid non-interventionist rhetoric. Instead, it should strategically position itself where its interests lie. Furthermore, China must not regard global events as distant and irrelevant to itself, nor should it shy away from influencing their outcomes. Such a stance risks self-isolation. Indeed, China’s habitual detachment from global affairs only reinforces an image of shortsightedness and a lack of a comprehensive global strategy, which is not the path a nation aspiring to global power status should take.
China should not treat all nations equally but should cultivate a posture of “prosperity for those who align with us, and ruin for those who oppose us.” The world fears the United States precisely because its entire political and societal framework exudes this mindset, enabling it to maintain its position as a genuine global superpower. Other nations, whether willingly offering benefits or acting out of fear, often find themselves yielding to the U.S., which allows it to dictate terms as it sees fit. This dynamic helps explain why Trump’s so-called new isolationism was not genuine isolationism. Many affluent nations followed the U.S., not necessarily for mutual benefit but out of fear, uniting around it. Trump may have intended precisely this outcome. His proclaimed isolationism was likely a smokescreen aimed at China.
China exhibits an assumed sense of helplessness toward cosmopolitanism. If the realization of cosmopolitanism inherently requires active intervention, then China’s worldview remains far removed from substance. Such cosmopolitanism could ultimately lead to isolationism. As the complexities of the Middle East, Taiwan Strait, and South China Sea intensify, the Chinese-style, harmonious “under-heaven” worldview is gradually losing its efficacy. When influence cannot even be exerted within its immediate sphere, events in more distant regions will inevitably be perceived as irrelevant to China. The world will merely regard China as an economic giant, nothing more, and this could lead to a true isolationist predicament.
In such a scenario, China would have no true friends or real enemies. The distribution of interests would always be based on short-term balance. This situation would compel China to focus more on short-term decision-making rather than perpetually “playing the long game.”
