According to rumors, Japanese ships intruded into Chinese territorial waters for nearly 20 minutes before being driven away because China’s Type 054A frigate couldn’t keep up with Japan’s Suzutsuki-class warship.
From the investigative records provided by Japanese media, this intrusion into Chinese territorial waters by the Suzutsuki was different from the provocations by the United States or other countries in the South China Sea. Unlike the brief incursions that merely skim the edge of China’s territorial baseline, the Suzutsuki boldly intruded at high speed and lingered in Chinese waters for about 20 minutes.
According to reports, the Chinese military detected the intrusion immediately and issued a verbal warning to drive away the Japanese ship. However, the Japanese ship did not turn back but instead accelerated further towards the Zhejiang coastal area after the warning.
The Japanese ship and Chinese vessels engaged in a standoff in Chinese waters for nearly 20 minutes before the Japanese ship exited. Japan explained this series of actions as a technical malfunction, but it seemed more like an unauthorized solo action by the ship’s captain.
This incident revealed some technical performance issues with China’s naval vessels, which could affect the future development of Chinese frigates and other forces. The inability to promptly drive away the accelerating Japanese ship likely points to a deficiency in the power and maneuverability of China’s tracking and surveillance ships.
The standard procedure for handling such intrusions involves dispatching ships to track and monitor the intruding vessel outside territorial waters, issuing verbal warnings before it enters, and using other measures such as cutting across its path to force it out, up to firing warning shots or sinking it if necessary. For example, during the 1988 Black Sea bumping incident, the Soviet Union issued warnings for over an hour before deciding to bump the American ship 7 nautical miles from Sevastopol.
It is speculated that China’s failure to drive away the Japanese ship immediately by cutting across its path might be due to the performance limitations of the Type 054A frigates used for monitoring and repelling intruders. The maximum power output of the four diesel engines on the 054A-class is only 23 megawatts, with a typical maximum output of 21 megawatts, making it difficult for the 4000-ton class frigate to achieve a top speed of 28 knots.
In contrast, the Suzutsuki, a 6000-ton class general-purpose destroyer of the Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, employs a combined gas and gas (COGAG) propulsion system, with four gas turbines providing 47 megawatts of power, almost double that of the Type 054A frigate. This larger size and greater power enable the Suzutsuki to easily exceed 30 knots, with significant acceleration advantages.
For the Type 054A frigate and the slower Type 056A-class corvette, facing such high-speed vessels determined to intrude into territorial waters, there is little ability to intercept them through maneuvering. The only option is to summon larger, faster 052-series destroyers or urgently deploy aircraft to resolve the issue. Even the 052D-class destroyer, with its combined diesel and gas (CODAG) propulsion, falls short in performance compared to Japan’s main ships.
This isn’t the first time China has faced issues with insufficient power and inability to catch up during interception missions. The U.S. Navy’s Littoral Combat Ships, which can exceed 40 knots and regularly maintain over 30 knots in the South China Sea, have been a significant peacetime challenge. The Chinese navy often needs to deploy multiple ships from different directions to chase and block them.
Setting aside the new-generation destroyer Type 055, both the previous generation Type 052 and 054 warships share the common drawback of relatively low power output, resulting in lower maneuverability and especially poor high-speed acceleration.
While the U.S. Navy’s powerful propulsion systems, such as the 100-megawatt total power output of the four LM2500 gas turbines in the Spruance, Ticonderoga, and Arleigh Burke classes, are well-known, other major adversaries like the South Korean and Japanese navies have also fully transitioned to high-power, gas-turbine propulsion for their main ships. This power performance advantage poses a significant challenge in daily confrontations.
Looking to the future, China has the capability to build ships with superior power performance and needs to address this requirement. Optimizing hydrodynamic design to reduce drag and increase top speed, enhancing power system performance to boost output, and improving high-speed capabilities are all crucial considerations for the design of the next generation of platforms.
The Type 054A frigate, as a cost-effective medium-sized frigate priced at only 1.5 billion RMB, offers excellent value and sufficient anti-air and anti-submarine capabilities. It serves well as a secondary main ship for decisive battles or a large offshore service ship for service fleets. However, as a 20-year-old all-diesel platform, its poor power performance, low top speed, and inadequate acceleration and maneuverability do limit its use in low-intensity confrontation tasks.
In this regard, the Soviet Union and now the Russian navy have had a significant advantage. As early as the 1970s, the Soviet 1135-class guard ships, with four gas turbines on a 3000-ton class frigate, showcased superior power performance. Due to cost considerations and limitations in gear transmission technology, China has historically adopted a more frugal approach to ship power systems.
However, it is now time for China to fully upgrade the power systems of its new generation of ships. Whether it is the technically complex combined diesel and gas (CODAG) system or the next-generation combined diesel-electric and gas (CODLAG) system, China’s military-industrial complex should be able to produce reliable products to meet these needs.