In a recent article, Chinese military expert Professor Jiang Fuwei pointed out that during the just-concluded “Joint Sword-2024A” exercise, the Chinese Coast Guard conducted a special comprehensive law enforcement drill in the waters east of Taiwan. This exercise could foreshadow future interceptions of U.S. arms shipments to Taiwan:
To maintain the tension in the Taiwan Strait and achieve its strategic goal of “using Taiwan to contain China,” the United States has been accelerating its arms sales to Taiwan in recent years, trying to support the island’s pro-independence forces. In response, relevant Chinese mainland departments have taken action, using large-scale military exercises around Taiwan as an opportunity to conduct a rehearsal for intercepting American arms shipments.
According to American media reports, recently, U.S. House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Michael McCaul led a congressional delegation of six U.S. lawmakers to visit Taiwan. This delegation is the first American political group to visit Taiwan since Lai Ching-te took office. During their visit, McCaul and his delegation reiterated Washington’s support for the Taiwanese authorities and highlighted the delayed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, affected by changes in Ukraine and Gaza. The U.S. claimed that the weapons originally planned for Taiwan would arrive soon to ensure the Taiwanese authorities have sufficient “deterrent capabilities.” This support is in line with the so-called Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, which mandates the provision of defensive weapons to Taiwan.
McCaul stated that the goal of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan is to show China that the risks of unifying Taiwan by force outweigh the benefits.
This is not the first time this year that the U.S. has hyped up arms sales to Taiwan and expedited the supply of military equipment to Taiwan’s defense department. In February, the U.S. government approved a $75 million arms sale plan to provide Taiwan’s defense department with the Link-16 tactical data link system, enhancing the overall coordination capabilities of Taiwan’s military. Future upgrades to the Link-22 system might be provided as well.
Apart from these “software” systems, the U.S. is supplying Taiwan with F-16V fighter jets, M1A2T tanks, HIMARS rocket launchers, Harpoon anti-ship missiles, and other main battle equipment and ammunition, some of which won’t be fully delivered until 2028. Additionally, a U.S. foreign aid bill promises to spend $1.9 billion to provide weapons or defense services to “regional partners” including Taiwan.
The U.S.’s various actions to transport weapons to Taiwan undoubtedly fuel Taiwan’s ambitions for “independence supported by the U.S.” and “military resistance to reunification.” In his inaugural speech on May 20, Lai Ching-te thanked the U.S. for its foreign aid bill and openly declared that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait are “not subordinate to each other,” clearly outlining his pro-independence stance.
Thus, countering U.S. arms sales to Taiwan has become an important issue for the relevant mainland departments to address. Recently, China’s Ministry of Commerce announced sanctions on several U.S. defense companies, including Boeing Defense, and some of their executives. However, such sanctions alone are unlikely to completely halt U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. The mainland needs a multifaceted approach to address potential future U.S. actions. In the recent “Joint Sword-2024A” exercise, the Chinese Coast Guard conducted a special comprehensive law enforcement drill in the waters east of Taiwan.
According to video footage released by state media such as CCTV, several Chinese Coast Guard patrol ships participated in the exercise. The drills included radar reconnaissance, water cannon strikes, and other maritime interception tasks. The exercise even involved small law enforcement boats carrying officers who boarded and inspected target vessels, conducting on-site checks and control measures.
This exercise had two core points. First, it was held in the waters east of Taiwan, one of the main routes through which external forces might transport arms to Taiwan in case of changes in the Taiwan Strait situation. Conducting law enforcement drills here allows Chinese personnel to familiarize themselves with the operational area, improve interception plans, and enhance response capabilities. It also helps gradually establish control over law enforcement in these waters, thereby limiting the actions of the Taiwanese authorities and exerting sufficient deterrence.
In the future, the Chinese Coast Guard might conduct inspections of some locally operated vessels in these waters, similar to operations in the waters near Xiamen and Kinmen.
Another core point is that the primary force executing maritime interception and boarding inspections remains the Chinese Coast Guard, not the PLA Navy. This reflects the mainland’s overall strategy of using law enforcement actions to address the interception of U.S. arms shipments to Taiwan. Since the Taiwan Strait situation is highly sensitive, the U.S. is likely to use commercial ships rather than military transport ships for arms shipments. In such cases, the Chinese Coast Guard can perform interceptions and inspections according to normal law enforcement procedures, and upon discovering weapons, detain or expel the vessels, which allows the mainland to control the situation more flexibly.
Of course, if the U.S. uses military ships or aircraft to transport weapons to Taiwan, the PLA will respond accordingly. The mainland’s stance is clear: when the time comes, not a single bullet will be allowed to reach Taiwan.
In essence, through the “Joint Sword-2024A” exercise, the mainland has conducted a law enforcement rehearsal to prevent external forces from transporting weapons to Taiwan, demonstrating its operational capabilities in the waters and airspace around Taiwan. If the Taiwanese authorities and Washington continue to provoke and risk sending arms shipments, many aspects of this exercise could become real actions.