US Media Hype:
US media are stirring up concerns over China’s extensive construction of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) silos in locations such as Yumen in Gansu Province, Hami in Xinjiang, and Jilantai in Ordos City, Inner Mongolia.
Chinese Media Response:
Chinese media have countered these claims, stating that these are merely wind power projects.
Analysis Summary:
– Locations and Numbers: According to analysis, there are 120 silos under construction in Guazhou, 110 in Hami, and an additional 10 in Jilantai (which already had 4 silos), making a conservative estimate of 240 silos in total. The US has three Minuteman III missile bases (Francis E. Warren, Minot, and Malmstrom Air Force Bases) with 150 silos each, totaling 450 silos.
– Discrepancies and Skepticism: There is uncertainty as to why the US might confuse wind power bases with missile silos and why estimates fluctuate between 240 and 360. The 3-kilometer spacing between sites suggests a layout typical of missile silos rather than wind farms, reminiscent of the MX missile concept. The construction appears to be handled by civilian companies, with the use of 10000 psi high-strength concrete no longer being cutting-edge technology.
Potential Scenarios for China:
1. All False: The bases are simply wind power foundations.
2. Partially Real: 1/10 of the sites are actual silos, with the rest being decoys. This approach is cost-effective and highly deterrent but poses a risk of revealing the locations of real silos due to potential leaks, a situation with historical precedent in China.
3. All Real: Establishing robust silos akin to the MX era.
Potential Missiles China Could Use:
– DF-5C: Known to exist and absent from the 2019 display, it can carry an estimated 6 warheads of 650 kilotons each (some believe up to 10).
– DF-41: A mobile ICBM with potential silo launch capability, believed to carry 3 warheads of 650 kilotons each (compared to Minuteman III’s 1-2).
– Modified DF-41: Enhanced with new propellant to increase lift-off weight and payload capacity.
– Unknown Solid-Fuel Rocket: Potentially developed using technologies from the Kuaizhou-1A solid rocket, resembling the R-36 missile with solid propellant and new casing.
Significance for China:
– Cost of TEL Launchers: Mobile launchers are expensive, and maintaining missile brigade readiness is costly.
– Silo-Based Readiness: Silos can be on constant alert and allow for immediate counterstrikes (nuclear reception), with lower operating costs.
– Payload Efficiency: TEL-launched missiles are limited to 50 tons at lift-off, whereas silo-based missiles can easily reach 100 tons.
– Heavy Silo-Based Missiles: Comparable to the MX and R-36, capable of delivering 10-12 warheads at once, matching the efficiency of a 12-vehicle Topol launcher brigade.
Challenges with Fake Silos:
Decoys must visually match real silos, driving up costs. Strong electromagnetic signals between silos and external sources could reveal actual silo locations.
Construction and Protection of Missile Silo Covers:
Chinese military silos typically use carbon steel or alloy steel frameworks with reinforced concrete bodies. The heavy silo covers require robust transport and slow opening/closing speeds, hindering rapid response. Modern warfare demands faster reaction times and higher impact resistance, necessitating the development of lightweight, high-strength silo covers. Except for DF-5 silos, most Chinese silos are designed to withstand extreme pressure, making them very heavy.
Images for Reference:
Direct images provide more detailed insight:
