In recent years, due to shifting dynamics in defense postures and the continuous strengthening of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Japan’s maritime and aerial military capabilities have gradually waned in comparison to the PLA. However, engagements have primarily concentrated around the East China Sea, which seemed manageable for Japan. But the latest development indicates otherwise.
On March 26th, the Japanese Ministry of Defense admitted that the PLA’s reconnaissance drone, the WZ-7 (Wuzhen-7), appeared for the first time in the Sea of Japan, circling before returning. More significantly, the WZ-7 may not have detoured through the Tsushima Strait after takeoff but instead flew directly into the Sea of Japan.
Geographically, whether PLA aircraft fly into the Sea of Japan from the northeast or east China, they must either traverse the Tsushima Strait or bypass it through the East China Sea. However, there were no radar detections around the Tsushima Strait, indicating the sudden appearance of the WZ-7 over the Sea of Japan caught Japan off guard.
For Japan and the U.S. forces stationed there, the actions of the WZ-7 not only mock their operational capabilities but also signify that the Sea of Japan will become an area where the PLA can come and go as it pleases.
Although the Sea of Japan is mostly international waters, its strategic significance in constraining and threatening Japan’s islands and serving as a route to the Korean Peninsula has always been paramount for Japan.
During WWII, despite the U.S. controlling much of the Pacific, the Sea of Japan remained off-limits. Japan deployed numerous vessels to patrol, ensuring U.S. submarines couldn’t enter through the Tsushima, Soya, and Tsugaru Straits. Today, both the Japanese Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. forces stationed in Japan closely monitor these straits to track any maritime or aerial activity entering the Sea of Japan.
Regarding the specifics of the WZ-7’s reconnaissance capabilities, there is limited public information. However, reports suggest its high-resolution synthetic aperture radar can detect targets over 200 kilometers away, covering tens of thousands of square kilometers within an hour. This recent circling over the Sea of Japan likely provided clear views of coastal targets in central Japan.
Furthermore, alongside the WZ-7’s activities, a fleet comprising PLA naval vessels, including the 052D Huainan, 054A Daqing, 903A Kokoxili Lake, and 799 electronic reconnaissance ship “Jinxing,” also entered the Sea of Japan. This suggests a coordinated operation or exercise by the PLA Navy and Air Force, possibly aimed at reconnaissance and pressure testing on Japan.
Most significantly, the WZ-7’s potential departure from China’s east or northeast and its entry into the Sea of Japan through North Korean or Russian airspace signify a significant shift. This implies a military agreement or memorandum between China, Russia, and North Korea, indicating a new level of military trust. This could lead to further military cooperation among the three countries.
This development is unsettling for the U.S., Japan, and South Korea, especially considering the potential ramifications of increased military support from North Korea or China. The involvement of China’s industrial capacity and technological advantage could exacerbate the situation, posing a serious challenge to the U.S.
Even without this possibility, the PLA’s ability to freely enter the Sea of Japan via the Tumen River estuary poses a significant threat. This means the PLA has another route besides the East China Sea to closely surveil and test Japan’s Air Self-Defense Force.
In conclusion, the PLA’s presence in the Sea of Japan places further strain on Japan’s already burdened Air Self-Defense Force. It forces them to expend resources and may lead to increased reliance on expensive assets like the F-35A. The PLA’s ability to operate drones freely in Japan’s vicinity signifies a profound shift in regional power dynamics, underscoring the need for Japan and its allies to reassess their defense strategies. (Wang Yanan)
