Taiwan Think Tank: PLA Plans Initial 50,000 Troop Landing on 20 ‘Red Beaches’

Taiwan’s defense research institute, the “National Security Institute,” with an official background, released its annual report for 2023 on the 8th, analyzing that if Beijing decides to attack Taiwan, based on the current capabilities of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), the estimated initial landing force would be around 52,000 troops, with approximately 20 “red beaches” identified in Taiwan.

The report indicates that the PLA’s Army Aviation Brigade and Airborne Assault Brigade can transport around 12,000 troops, and they also have helicopter units. The PLA’s Navy Amphibious Fleet can transport approximately 24,000 combat troops and 900 amphibious armored vehicles. The PLA’s Army Amphibious Combined Brigade can transport at least 16,000 troops or 400 amphibious armored vehicles. The total estimated landing force is around 52,000 people.

PLA Landing Craft During Exercises.

The National Security Institute’s analysis suggests that the PLA currently lacks sufficient conventional amphibious transport capabilities. In the future, the PLA might convert civilian ships into a maritime militia transport unit, experimenting with the use of civilian transport resources for military missions. These civilian ships mainly come from the larger-tonnage Bohai Bay route, with fewer options from the smaller-tonnage Qiongzhou Bay route. The PLA’s experiment with “civilian ships for military use” has achieved some success but has not been widely implemented.

The analysis indicates that if Beijing decides on a PLA amphibious attack on Taiwan, they would need to establish a circular three-dimensional landing field, including “red beaches,” airports, and ports in Taiwan. Based on previously verified “red beaches” by the Taiwanese military, key locations include beaches at Tawian’s Taoyuan Zhuwei Fishing Port, Linkou Baodou Village, Jinshan Zhongjiaowan, Shueiwei Fishing Port Beach, Baiyang Palace Beach in Shijiao, Danshui Shalun, Bali Wazizhiwei, Yilan Lizhe, Zhuangwei, Toucheng, beaches in Hualien Qixingtan, Taitung Zhiben Beach, Tainan Anping, Golden Beach, Xishu Beach in Kaohsiung, and other areas.

A military exercise simulating a PLA landing was conducted in Pingtung, Taiwan on July 28, 2022. (Annabelle Chih/Getty Images)

The report also analyzes potential weaknesses of the PLA, such as conducting an over 100-kilometer amphibious landing across the Taiwan Strait. The report notes that the PLA lacks experience in amphibious operations, and Taiwan’s deployment of asymmetric capabilities like anti-ship and anti-air capabilities poses significant risks for the PLA’s landing. Additionally, Taiwan’s geographical environment is not conducive to amphibious operations, with only about 20 beaches in the northern and western parts of Taiwan suitable for landing. “Once the PLA lands, it will immediately face mountainous terrain, hills, and densely populated urban areas, unfavorable for the movement of large-scale mechanized forces.”

Facing these terrain obstacles, during the decisive phase of joint amphibious landing operations, the PLA might transition from “shoreline landing” to “airborne assault operations,” seizing strategic locations such as ports, airports, or other key areas to facilitate the rapid deployment of the second wave of forces. Therefore, defending ports and airports becomes a top priority for Taiwan’s defense operations in the future.

Due to the constraints of Taiwan’s terrain, some scholars believe that the PLA would face difficulties in landing. (Facebook@國防部發言人)

The report indicates that the first wave of PLA airborne assault and shoreline landing forces is only equipped with light weapons and lightweight armored vehicles, urgently requiring subsequent ammunition and fuel supplies. If the supply of ammunition and fuel is cut off, their combat capability will be reduced to zero, and the Taiwanese military could potentially sever the PLA’s maritime supply lines, becoming the most effective asymmetric means of countering the PLA.

The report warns that if the PLA decides on an amphibious attack on Taiwan, they will likely first disable Taiwan’s command and control systems through aerial and missile strikes, rendering Taiwan blind and unable to resist. Therefore, protecting critical infrastructure, military capabilities, and decentralized command and control becomes the primary goal for developing Taiwan’s defense resilience, providing an effective deterrent.

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