In the recent military conflict between Israel and Palestine, the Israeli Army’s most advanced “Merkava 4M” main battle tank was unexpectedly destroyed by an anti-tank ammunition dropped by a drone operated by Hamas. This incident ignited discussions on how tanks can defend against drones.
This is the first known instance in the public domain where an advanced main battle tank equipped with an active defense system has been destroyed by a drone. It underscores the fact that in the face of omnipresent drones on the modern and future battlefield, the survivability of ground-based heavy equipment, including main battle tanks, is increasingly in question.
Why have drones become the main anti-tank force?
The general perception of anti-tank weapons in modern warfare includes anti-tank missiles, rocket launchers, cannons, and mines, with the tank itself being seen as one of the prime anti-tank weapons. However, with the widespread adoption of small and micro drone technology in recent years, drones are becoming a mainstream anti-tank weapon.
The initial tactic of using drones to attack armored vehicles appeared on the Iraq battlefield. At the time, anti-US forces, lacking the capability to directly confront the heavily-armed US and Iraqi government forces, employed small and micro drones, especially consumer-grade multi-rotor drones, to drop various small anti-tank munitions from the air. If the drone operator is skilled and lucky, the dropped munition might enter an open hatch of a tank, resulting in significant damage. Moreover, these micro drones can also carry high-explosive munitions to target enemy personnel.
This micro drone anti-tank tactic grew popular and evolved in Syria and Yemen, shining in the recent Russia-Ukraine conflict. As combatants began using FPV micro racing drones on the battlefield, equipped with various anti-tank munitions, these drones have morphed into even more elusive micro-swarm flying missiles. Unlike the earlier drones that drop munitions, these kamikaze-style FPV micro racing drones are faster, more agile, and can attack armored vehicles from all directions, especially hitting their weaker sides and rear, resulting in higher hit probabilities and destruction.
In comparison with traditional anti-tank weapons, micro anti-tank drones are less detectable, more agile in flight, cost-effective, and can carry diverse weaponry. They typically employ batteries to drive propellers, producing minimal sound, light, electrical, and infrared signatures, unlike piston-engined cruise missiles which can be heard from a distance. Therefore, ground personnel, especially those inside armored vehicles, have great difficulty detecting incoming micro anti-tank drones.
Moreover, micro anti-tank drones are flexible in control, targeting weak spots on armored vehicles. They are cheap, enabling mass deployment for swarm attacks against isolated or grouped vehicles. Some armed groups can assemble rudimentary multi-rotor micro drones from readily available parts, equipping them with various anti-tank munitions, either for air drops or kamikaze-style attacks, offering diverse and agile operational tactics.
Previously, the munitions used on micro anti-tank drones were modified from existing ordnance. For instance, Ukrainian personnel, risking their lives, disassembled 155mm cluster munitions supplied by the US to use the submunitions as drone payloads. Now, an increasing number of military enterprises are developing specialized small munitions for drone payloads, indicating that future micro anti-tank drones and their munitions will be more standardized, formal, and precise.
Main Battle Tanks and Their Difficulty in Defending against Drones
Compared to the many technical advantages of micro anti-tank drones, tank crews, virtually sitting inside “giant turtle shells,” face almost all disadvantages.
Firstly, tank crews have limited situational awareness of the surrounding battlefield and even less for aerial threats. Their primary means of external situational awareness are various optical sighting devices. Even though some new tank designs incorporate turret-mounted optical sights that can observe the sky at steep angles, these are still in the research and testing phase and have not been widely deployed.
Given this limitation, when a micro anti-tank drone hovers overhead preparing to drop its munition, the tank crew will likely remain unaware. As mentioned earlier, these drones have weak signal characteristics and, coupled with the limited observational capabilities of tank crews, detection is near impossible unless a crew member happens to be looking upwards at the precise moment of the drone’s approach. By the time they realize, their only option would be to abandon the tank.
During the recent conflict, a Hamas-operated micro anti-tank drone, possibly carrying a tandem warhead heavy anti-tank munition, silently flew directly above an Israeli “Merkava 4M” main battle tank. All hatches of the tank were closed, and the crew inside was unaware of the impending threat from above. To ensure accuracy, the drone even reduced its hover altitude and targeted the front right side of the tank where the engine compartment is located. As the munition descended, the tank’s turret rotated, causing the munition to impact and detonate on the protruding front part of the turret. However, the tandem warhead’s powerful jet of molten metal still penetrated the engine compartment, destroying the turbocharged diesel engine, depriving the tank of power, and igniting the fuel. The tank crew had no choice but to abandon the vehicle and were subsequently captured by waiting Hamas militants.
Possible Technical Measures
Given that micro anti-tank drones have become one of the major threats to tanks on today’s and future battlefields, are there technical measures that tanks can adopt to enhance their defenses against these drones?
The author believes that two avenues, detection and interception, could be explored. First, in terms of battlefield situational awareness for tank crews, a system capable of full-spectrum, all-air-domain detection of micro anti-tank drones is essential. Currently, some countries are incorporating new turret-mounted high-performance electro-optic sighting systems into their next-generation tanks, providing initial aerial surveillance capabilities. Moreover, many nations have developed various types of counter-drone systems that employ a combination of sound, light, and electrical detection methods. Since micro anti-tank drones have weak signal characteristics, deploying high-performance, high-sensitivity detectors that utilize diverse types of detection methods would greatly increase the chances of discovering and tracking them. The main challenge is integrating such a comprehensive drone detection system into tanks and seamlessly linking it with the tank’s combat command and control system.
Additionally, in terms of interception, highly autonomous remote weapon stations will be the primary means for new-generation armored vehicles to defend against micro anti-tank drones, using hard-kill measures. Many counter-drone systems developed by various countries employ soft-kill methods, such as electronic jamming or electromagnetic pulses, to disrupt drone control. However, these soft-kill methods can also severely affect friendly equipment, including the electromagnetic compatibility of the tanks themselves, friendly drones, and electronic devices. Therefore, hard-kill will be the best method for tanks to defend against drones. Taking inspiration from systems like the “Kashtan” close-in weapon system used on ships, new-generation tanks can be equipped with highly autonomous remote weapon stations that can independently detect, identify, track, lock onto, and destroy enemy drones.
If one wishes to avoid spending too much money or effort, a simpler approach would be to adopt a method used by the Russian Army: mounting extensive metal grilles or mesh armor on the turret of armored vehicles or, more extremely, creating a large metal cage encompassing most of the tank. While a rudimentary approach, it can still offer some degree of protection on the battlefield.
Source: ThePaper