The Biden administration’s stringent policy toward China has further deteriorated the U.S.-China relationship, leading many to view the current situation as entering a “quasi-Cold War” phase. Despite a strategy aimed at suppressing and containing China, the Biden government has been vigorously engaging in diplomatic activities with the country. Out of a desire to establish barriers against conflicts, the U.S. has shown genuine concerns over sparking unintended confrontations. This combination of wanting victory while fearing defeat clearly demonstrates the U.S.’s sense of helplessness towards China.
Since the G20 leaders’ meeting on Bali Island in Indonesia last November, where Biden met with Xi Jinping, there have been two rounds of U.S.-China diplomatic interactions, with signs of a third underway. Intriguingly, even as the two countries regard each other as adversaries, their interactions have been the most frequent in the past year – more frequent than the U.S.’s interactions with its allies. This fact underscores the pivotal bilateral relationship between the two, which isn’t easy to decouple.
The first diplomatic interaction led to the Bali Island meeting. However, despite reaching a “Bali Consensus,” the U.S. neither implemented the consensus nor refrained from provoking new issues, inevitably drawing strong countermeasures from China. The “drifting balloon incident” marked a turning point, signaling to the U.S. that their current approach was untenable.
As a result, a second round of diplomatic interactions commenced. While these talks were purportedly to implement the Bali meeting consensus, in reality, they centered on establishing a new communication mechanism. U.S. officials indicated a shift from previous dialogue modes, suggesting a dismissal of prior agreements and a fresh start. This led to visits to China by U.S. officials including Secretary of State Antony Blinken, Treasury Secretary Janet L. Yellen, Climate Envoy John Kerry, and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo.
Although Raimondo’s visit concluded with the establishment of a new working group and a new sanctions communication mechanism, the surprise launch of Huawei’s new 5G phone caught the world’s attention. The global response signified not just the significance of the phone but also China’s monumental breakthrough in the semiconductor sector. This was especially noteworthy given Raimondo’s significant role in the U.S. policy of suppressing China’s semiconductor industry. Almost simultaneously, Chinese electric vehicles stole the limelight at the Munich Auto Show, startling both the U.S. and the world.
In light of these developments, Biden’s China policy requires a significant recalibration. A central dilemma arises: should the U.S. continue its policy of containment, or should it abandon it? Reflecting on its own strategy, the U.S. realizes that dialogue with China is now essential, especially given China’s advancements in core technologies, which pose a significant threat to U.S. interests.
Against this backdrop, a brief conversation between Biden and Premier Li Qiang at the G20 summit in India foreshadowed the beginning of another round of diplomatic interactions. Following this, Wang Yi, the Director of the Central Foreign Affairs Commission and Chinese Foreign Minister, had a 12-hour discussion with U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan in Malta. Their meeting set the stage for further consultations on U.S.-China Pacific affairs, maritime affairs, and foreign policy. This latest development in U.S.-China interactions signifies a mutual effort to build a new institutional dialogue and consultation mechanism.
Subsequent interactions involved meetings between U.S. Deputy Secretary of State and China’s Deputy Commerce Minister Ma Zhaoxu, and another between Blinken and China’s Vice President Han Zheng at the U.N. General Assembly. Such intense diplomatic interactions reveal the U.S.’s desperation and its repeated attempts to persuade China, emphasizing mutual benefits and risks.
20 years of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have severely depleted the U.S.’s vitality. The U.S. economy remains troubled, with ongoing inflation and looming debt crises. The U.S. dollar’s global dominance is waning, with a growing trend of “de-dollarization” worldwide. In this strategic predicament, the U.S. cannot afford an escalated confrontation with China. Biden’s initial focus on the Indo-Pacific strategy to contain China has been stymied by unresolved U.S.-EU relations and other global strategic shifts, with the U.S. not gaining any clear advantages from its confrontations with China.
Furthermore, the upcoming U.S. presidential elections add another layer of complexity. As Biden’s term nears its end, there’s a pressing need to showcase achievements. A significant diplomatic shortfall has been the inability to arrange mutual visits between U.S. and Chinese leaders, which could negatively impact the upcoming elections. Thus, the Biden administration is keen to ensure that everything in the U.S.-China relationship is under control, with mutual visits being a top priority.
While a Biden-Xi meeting at the G20 summit in India did not materialize, the Biden administration is now actively working towards a meeting at the APEC conference. Beijing’s position has been clear: willingness to talk but demanding genuine commitment from the U.S. In essence, both parties are well-aware that the U.S.’s global dominance strategy won’t change, and its policy of containing China remains firm. This ensures that the U.S. and China will remain competitors, and their relationship will likely deteriorate as China’s strength grows.
Source: HK01
