Chen Dongxiao, president of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies, recently published an article saying that the war between Russia and Ukraine has had a serious impact on Sino-US relations:
As early as a year before Russia launched a “special military operation” against Ukraine on February 24, 2022, there had been a “paradigm shift” in the interaction model of Sino-US relations – Washington generally believed that Sino-US relations had entered a “protracted war” in the strategic game: The Biden administration has generally taken over the mantle of the Trump administration’s containment of China. The difference is that the former pays more attention than the latter to how to shape an international environment conducive to “containment of China”, while at least verbally placing more emphasis on setting “guardrails” to prevent the derailment of strategic competition. Correspondingly, Beijing also increasingly believes that Sino-US relations have entered a stalemate in the strategic game. The mainstream narrative in China is that the game between China and the United States reflects the struggle between the two countries in terms of power, system, and ideas, and will run through the entire process of the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Competition and struggle are generally seen as central words in Washington and Beijing’s handling of bilateral relations.
Of course, the actual situation seems more nuanced. On the one hand, unlike the frequent rhetoric between officials of the two countries, the leaders of the two sides still emphasized in the limited dialogue that there should be room for cooperation between China and the United States to jointly deal with global issues, and each has expressed a willingness not to let relations slip into a “new cold war”. On the other hand, China is making every effort to prepare for the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in 2022, and the United States is also facing a more urgent political agenda of mid-term elections. Regardless of the domestic demand for stabilizing the economy, or the less enthusiastic but more predictable interaction between the policy teams of the two countries than under Trump, people have higher expectations for a stable China-U.S. relationship. In this regard, China is obviously more action-oriented than the United States. At the beginning of this year, Beijing commemorated the 50th anniversary of the China-US Shanghai Communiqué with a high profile and continuously called on Washington to regain the “Shanghai Communiqué spirit” of “seeking great common ground and reserving great differences” to illuminate the way forward for Sino-US relations.
However, the sharp escalation of the Russian-Ukrainian crisis and the detonation of Russia’s direct military attack on the entire territory of Ukraine not only caught Beijing by surprise, but also the protracted war and the danger of further large-scale escalation undoubtedly brought difficulties to the already very difficult and fragile bilateral relations. Another boulder has been pressed, significantly increasing the difficulty for Beijing to handle Sino-US relations.
The triple dilemma
First, the Russian-Ukrainian crisis and conflict have further exacerbated mutual suspicion and hostility between China and the United States. On the one hand, Washington and Beijing have profound differences over the origin of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the attribution of responsibility. The essence is that the two sides have major differences in the nature of the current international order and their vision for future development. Washington condemned Moscow’s “war of aggression” against Ukraine, violating the UN Charter and basic norms of international relations, and accused China of failing to publicly condemn Russia’s aggressive behavior. Beijing emphasizes that the Russia-Ukraine crisis is not only a complex historical latitude and longitude, but also that the continuous eastward expansion of NATO since the post-Cold War ignores Russia’s reasonable security concerns. As the U.S. vigorously provides military assistance to Ukraine, passed a US$40 billion aid bill to Ukraine, and imposed unprecedented economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation on Russia, senior officials of the Biden administration and leaders of both parties in the U.S. Congress have also expressed their intention to “weaken Russia” in a comprehensive manner. According to China, the U.S. and NATO are engaged in a “proxy war” with Russia, and the real strategic goal of the U.S. is to “bring down Russia” through the prolongation of the war in Ukraine. In addition, senior White House officials have repeatedly reiterated that the Russia-Ukraine conflict does not change the U.S. judgment that “China is the most important strategic adversary of the United States. The U.S. and the West hope that this war will restore their weakened dominance of the international order and reverse Beijing’s oft-repeated “East up, West down” trajectory of global power.
On the other hand, after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the US has stepped up its hype of the “China-Russia Axis Theory”, which has also increased Beijing’s strategic vigilance and confrontation with Washington. From Beijing’s point of view, Washington and NATO leaders have taken out of context the words “China-Russia cooperation has no forbidden zone” in the “Sino-Russian Joint Statement” issued on February 4, 2022, in an attempt to assert that China is an “accomplice of Russia in waging war” “Crimes. After the United States and the West launched large-scale economic and financial sanctions on Russia, Washington also threatened that China could not help Russia out of trouble, otherwise it would face serious consequences. The U.S. Senate and House of Representatives passed the so-called “Axis Act”, which requires the U.S. State Department to submit regular reports to Congress on Sino-Russian cooperation and China’s assistance to Russia to evade sanctions against Russia by the United States and the West. Beijing denounced the US as “a thief shouting to catch a thief”, arguing that the US not only intends to use the Ukraine crisis to make money from the war, but also attempts to use the rhetoric of “democracy against dictatorship” to organize a joint camp against China and Russia internationally. Since the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the United States has significantly accelerated military alliance cooperation with China and Russia as imaginary enemies in Europe and the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing pointed out the trend of “Asia-Pacificization” and even “globalization” of NATO led by the United States, reflecting the strategic intention of the United States to further implement “dual containment” against China and Russia and promote a new Cold War.
The escalation of strategic hostility between the U.S. and Chinese governments over the Russia-Ukraine conflict has also further influenced the national sentiment of the two countries. According to an April 28 survey conducted by Pew Research, more than 90 percent of Americans surveyed believe the partnership between Russia and China is a “serious problem,” while negative views of China are “at a new high” – 82 percent of Americans surveyed have a negative view of China. More than 90 percent of Americans surveyed believe that the partnership between Russia and China is a “serious problem,” and a record number of Americans have a negative view of China – 82 percent. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has also generated widespread concern among the Chinese public. Both countries.
Second, the Russia-Ukraine conflict has further worsened the overall economic situation and economic security of each of China and the United States, and accelerated the degree of separation of the two sides’ technology and key industrial chains. On the one hand, the Russia-Ukraine conflict, combined with the divergent recovery from the pandemic and high inflation, has exacerbated the energy and food crises, adding to the already fragile and unbalanced post-pandemic world economic situation, and seriously affecting the two major economies of China and the U.S. as the main engines of the world economy. Commodity prices are rising in turn, making the Federal Reserve in curbing high inflation and recession prevention policy options between the dilemma. International economic analysts have issued warnings of stagflation or even another economic crisis in the United States. For the Chinese economy, the spreading war between Russia and Ukraine and the unprecedented scale of U.S. and Western sanctions and collateral sanctions against Russia have directly blocked Chinese investment and economic and trade exchanges with Ukraine and restricted China’s normal economic, trade and investment projects with Russia before the war. Moreover, China is accelerating the diversification of its food import structure in recent years, especially increasing imports of food crops and agricultural materials such as fertilizers from Russia and Ukraine to improve its own food security structure. The impact of the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine conflict and its derivative effects on the supply chain of food and fertilizers, overlaid with the negative impact of extreme weather on domestic food production in recent years, further increases China’s exposure to food security.
On the other hand, the Russian-Ukrainian war not only accelerated the decoupling trend of China and the United States in technology and key industrial chains, but also had a considerable impact on the cooperation between China and the United States in the financial field. Beijing is particularly concerned about two steps implemented by the United States. One is that the Senate recently passed the revised version of the American Competition Act, marking the fast lane of the U.S. legislature’s push for decoupling China’s technology and key industrial chains. The second is that President Joe Biden announced the official launch of the “Indo-Pacific Economic Framework” on May 23, marking that the United States is accelerating the construction of a “critical supply chain to China” alliance. For Beijing, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine not only makes Beijing face further pressure on the decoupling of Sino-US technology and key industrial chains, but also the United States and the West have launched an unprecedented financial war against Russia, including freezing Russia’s foreign exchange assets of more than 300 billion U.S. dollars in the United States and Western countries. It also makes Beijing increasingly aware of the importance and urgency of comprehensively preventing and counteracting the “financial war” carried out by the United States against China. How to comprehensively improve the defensive and offensive capabilities of China’s “financial weapons” in its struggle against the United States has become an important task that the Chinese government needs to vigorously plan and build. This also indicates that the “decoupling” trend of economic relations between China and the United States is accelerating from the real economy such as technology and key industrial chains to the virtual economy represented by finance and banking.
Third, the siren of escalating tensions in the Taiwan Strait has been sounded continuously. On the one hand, long before the escalation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the Biden administration inherited its predecessor’s strategy of “controlling China with Taiwan,” i.e., within the framework of Washington’s long-term competitive strategy with China, it significantly upgraded Taiwan’s political, economic and military security status in the U.S. global and regional strategy. The “One China Policy” of the U.S. government has been continuously hollowed out. For Beijing, two important regressions by the Biden administration on Taiwan have caused great alarm and dissatisfaction on the part of China. One is that Biden has basically inherited the major adjustments to Taiwan policy from his predecessor, the Trump administration, and has explicitly placed the Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances alongside the three U.S.-China Joint Communiqués as the legal and political basis for dealing with the Taiwan issue and cross-Strait relations, significantly This will greatly enhance the political and strategic significance of U.S.-Taiwan relations. Second, the Biden administration continues to intentionally confuse the positioning of the mainland and Taiwan under the U.S. “One China Policy,” and the frequent threats and pressure from the U.S. to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing are seen by Beijing as support for the “One China, One Taiwan” policy actually implemented by Taiwan’s DPP government. This is a serious provocation to support the “one China, one Taiwan” policy actually implemented by the DPP government. In China’s view, the U.S.’s increasingly hollow “One China Policy” no longer intersects much with China’s emphasis on the “One China Principle,” and the cornerstone of normalization of U.S.-China relations has been seriously eroded. Not only is the U.S. government increasingly deflating its “one-China policy,” but it is also intensifying U.S.-Taiwan political, military, and economic cooperation to deter the mainland from unifying Taiwan. Beijing’s perception of the U.S.-Taiwan relationship is bound to influence the direction of the Chinese government and public policy toward resolving the Taiwan issue.
On the other hand, after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the US government’s Taiwan Strait policy has the tendency to accelerate “strategic clarity”, making it more difficult for China and the US to effectively manage the Taiwan issue. Although in recent years there has been debate in the United States about whether to abandon the “strategic ambiguity” in the Taiwan Strait policy, it is generally limited to the circle of think tank experts. But after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, not only did think tank experts in Washington discuss the so-called “Russian-Ukrainian war on the Taiwan Strait” intensively, but the U.S. government and Congress also issued warnings about the prospect and consequences of the so-called Beijing’s possible military attack on Taiwan. Sullivan, the National Security Adviser to the US President, said that the Chinese mainland will learn from Russia’s war in Ukraine to prepare for a future “invasion” of Taiwan, and reiterated the US’s security commitment to Taiwan. U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen has threatened to impose sanctions on Beijing similar to those against Russia if mainland China uses force against Taiwan. From the perspective of the United States, the United States and the West have united all-round sanctions to isolate Russia, and assisting Ukraine to carry out a “protracted war” against Russia can not only weaken Russia, but also increase the deterrent effect on Beijing’s so-called “armed Taiwan”. The most striking thing during this period was when Biden visited Japan on May 23 and publicly declared that if war broke out in the Taiwan Strait, the US military would help defend Taiwan. Although the White House and Biden himself said afterwards that the US policy towards Taiwan has not changed, Beijing’s trust in the Biden administration, including his own policies on the Taiwan issue, has also dropped to a new low. At the same time, many think tank experts in Washington also unabashedly encouraged Taiwan to learn more from Ukraine’s “asymmetric” and “flexible” military strategy against Russia in confronting the mainland in conflict scenarios. In addition, Washington has also encouraged allies such as Japan and Australia to put pressure on Beijing on the Taiwan issue by strengthening military alliances in the Asia-Pacific. From the Chinese perspective, Washington deliberately compared Ukraine, a sovereign country, with Taiwan, a non-sovereign state, which exposed its hypocrisy of “not supporting Taiwan independence” and was a rationale for interfering in China’s reunification process in the future. After the Russia-Ukraine war, the U.S. government’s latest policy pronouncements or threats to China on the Taiwan Strait issue are further proof that the U.S. is escalating its efforts to “control China with Taiwan” and its policy of preventing cross-strait reunification by force is further clarified. With Beijing’s growing dissatisfaction and distrust of Washington on Taiwan-related issues, coupled with the current poorly functioning mechanism of dialogue and exchange between the two sides, uncertainty and the risk of crisis around the Taiwan Strait issue will continue to rise in the future, which is bound to seriously affect Sino-US relations and even global peace and stability.
Two major revelations
Whether it is for the international security order, the relationship between major powers or the development of the world economy, the military conflict between Russia and the United States and the West over Ukraine is another event of watershed significance since the end of the Cold War 30 years ago. Chaotic times are thought-provoking. For Sino-US relations, there are many lessons and inspirations behind the conflict between Russia and Ukraine, two of which are particularly important.
First, the security dilemma between major powers must be carefully managed. Generally speaking, unless an alliance is formed, security dilemmas between great powers are the norm and cannot be eradicated but managed. Numerous historical case studies have shown that the way to effectively alleviate the security dilemma of major powers first requires regular strategic communication and confidence-building measures between major powers to prevent each other’s stereotypes from consolidating their own dynamic cognition of their opponents, so as to continuously enhance mutual understanding of each other. Accurate grasp of strategic intent. Second, major powers should maintain a high degree of sensitivity to each other’s core security interests, and prevent the security dilemma from escalating or even getting out of control by constantly “cutting sausages” on each other’s core interests. The security dilemma theory also emphasizes the need to manage the stimulating effect of domestic political and ideological factors on security dilemmas, especially to prevent the exacerbation of strategic hostility and antagonism between major powers by speculating on “foreign enemies” in order to relieve domestic pressure and transfer domestic dilemmas.
These theoretical summaries are all derived from the tragedies of the evolution and even deterioration of the security dilemma of great powers that have been repeated in history. The outbreak of the US-Soviet Cold War after World War II was closely related to the failure to manage the security dilemma between the United States and the Soviet Union. For example, due to differences in security culture and historical experience, both the United States and the Soviet Union after World War II had difficulty understanding the complex reasons for each other’s security policies. In the process of this security dilemma, it is further magnified by two factors. One is to attribute the so-called “structural factors” such as ideology and even racial characteristics to the judgment of the other side’s strategic intentions. For example, Kennan’s long telegram was a typical representative of the US’s understanding of the Soviet Union at that time. Another important factor is that the domestic politics of the two countries have further exacerbated the mutual security dilemma. The nature of the U.S. political system, the checks and balances of power, and the role of interest groups have led U.S. leaders to exaggerate the dangers from abroad and increase their power at home. Similarly, the Soviet Union’s ideological interpretation of the behavior of the United States and the strong desire of the Soviet Union to control the Eastern European region made the inherent security dilemma between the United States and the Soviet Union escalate into a series of security confrontation events, which led to the full-scale outbreak of the Cold War.
The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has finally erupted into a clash of arms, bringing a serious impact on the security of the European region and the stability of the international order. While there are certainly complex historical origins and realistic entanglements of security interests behind it, it also reveals the failure of the long-term security dilemma management between Russia and the U.S. and NATO, which support the current Ukrainian government. Many U.S. strategists and former senior officials, including Kennan, Kissinger and Gates, have also acknowledged that NATO’s reneging on its promises and continuous eastward expansion after the Cold War have seriously stimulated Russia’s hostility. The U.S. and West’s long-standing “zero-sum game mentality” toward Russia, deep-rooted “stereotypical enemy intent,” and the need to serve domestic political agendas ultimately led to a dramatic escalation of the U.S.-Western security dilemma with Russia, with disastrous consequences. Similarly, China and the United States should learn from the experience and lessons of historical and real tragedies and work together to manage the increasingly serious security dilemma between the two countries.
Second, every effort must be made to prevent a new type of hybrid war between major powers from spiraling out of control. The Russia-Ukraine conflict has not only turned into a “proxy war” between the U.S. and the West and Russia, but also a new type of hybrid war in the 21st century that combines military warfare, intelligence warfare, financial warfare, cognitive warfare, diplomatic warfare and other fronts at the same time. The new hybrid war has many similarities to traditional military conflicts, including a large number of military and civilian casualties and property losses, but the biggest difference is the increased risk of unpredictable escalation (both horizontal and vertical). This unpredictability manifests itself in at least three ways.
The first is that the economic impact of a new type of hybrid war could quickly extend beyond the geographic scope of traditional warfare, creating a worldwide economic crisis. According to studies by UN agencies, the Russian-Ukrainian military conflict, especially the U.S. and Western mega-economic warfare against Russia, has caused severe energy and food shortages and a heavy debt crisis to quickly hit a wide range of developing and emerging economies, exposing them to the double blow of difficult post-pandemic recovery and the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Unlike traditional military conflicts, the risk of harm to the world economy from a new type of hybrid war between major powers has risen sharply.
Second, the “weaponization” of finance and its misuse increases the risk of escalation of traditional military conflicts. Although the U.S. and Western governments are relishing the fact that super economic sanctions against Russia are seriously eroding Russia’s economic operations, because the damage to Russia’s economy and society and the harm to the Russian population caused by the mega financial sanctions and economic blockade is often less than the direct bloody casualties and destruction of cities caused by warfare, those who impose them often do not have much psychological burden, leading to the misuse and perpetuation of financial weapons. trend. For the victims, is it simply a matter of countering the adversary with economic means in kind, or is it a matter of fully escalating the military conflict itself to counter the financial and economic warfare? If one side of the war believes that its adversary’s financial warfare has caused irreversible damage to its core security interests, it may significantly increase its incentive to escalate the war massively to force its adversary to back off.
Third, the shadow of nuclear war is once again looming over Europe. Let’s not forget that behind the Russia-Ukraine conflict is still a battle between the world’s two largest nuclear forces. With the Biden administration sending clear signals to “permanently weaken Russia” through a Russo-Ukrainian war, the U.S. has significantly elevated the position of Ukraine in the U.S. global strategy. Does this reinforce the Putin administration’s inherent notion that Russia’s battle with the U.S. and the West in Ukraine is a “life-or-death” battle for Russia? The Russian side has also sent a signal once again that if NATO and the US and the West’s involvement in the Ukrainian war and their support for Ukraine cause a strategic price that Russia cannot afford, Russia will not hesitate to use lethal weapons to counterattack, which also means that the entire NATO will fight back. In the face of another “Cuban Missile Crisis” and the danger of a “nuclear war” caused by it.
2,500 years ago, the ancient Chinese military scholar Sun Tzu pointed out that the military is the most important thing in the country, the place of life and death, the way of survival, and must not be ignored. No matter how much warfare changes, we still need to be aware of its fundamental impact on the life and death of nations and people. For Chinese and U.S. policymakers, maintaining the stability of Sino-U.S. relations, managing the competitive relationship between China and the U.S., and preventing it from getting out of control or even falling into confrontation and military conflict are matters of national importance that must be kept in mind and must not be ignored. Especially for those in the U.S. who are currently relishing the effects of a new type of hybrid war, they should seriously learn from the Russian-Ukrainian war.
