Emma Ashford, a senior fellow in the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, and Matthew Kroenig, deputy director of the center, have engaged in a heated debate on whether the U.S. is worth the risk of a so-called “help defend Taiwan,” according to the Chinese newspaper Reference News citing an October 8 report on Foreign Policy Website. And the full article was excerpted as below.
With PLA military aircraft frequently entering Taiwan’s “air defense identification zone” and U.S. special forces training Taiwan’s military to raise fears of war, is this a conflict the United States can handle? Emma Ashford, a senior fellow in the New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council’s Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security, talks with Matthew Kroenig, deputy director of the center.
Emma Ashford: Obviously, the U.S. is now quietly stationing military personnel in Taiwan. But let’s talk about the broader issue. The Biden administration has apparently expressed what it calls “diplomatic concerns” about the flight activities of PLA military aircraft. But when it comes to actual “assistance to Taiwan,” things are not so clear. Since the 1970s, the United States has maintained an ambiguous approach to the Taiwan issue, recognizing Taiwan as part of China. The important question now plaguing Washington is whether to change that position and make a clearer commitment to “Taiwan’s defense”.
Matthew Kroenig: I think it would be “wise” for the U.S. and its allies to make a clearer commitment to “help defend Taiwan”.
Emma Ashford: To be clear, Taiwan is not strategically important enough for the United States to risk war with China. There are countries in Asia, such as Japan and South Korea, that are important enough for the United States to make a defense commitment. But when it comes to Taiwan, the imbalance of interests and capabilities is simply too high. Unification has always been a central demand of the Chinese Communist Party. Taiwan is 100 miles (161 kilometers) from mainland China and 7,000 miles (11,265 kilometers) from the United States, and the American public is at best ambivalent about “help defend Taiwan”. Therefore, the United States should not commit to going to war to “defend Taiwan.”
Matthew Kroenig: I think the Chinese Communist Party’s argument is “aggressive” and “unreasonable.”
Emma Ashford: You should ask Mexico how they feel about the historical territorial claims of the United States! The reason I bring up China’s strong feelings about reunification is to highlight the imbalance between U.S. and Chinese interests in the Taiwan issue.
Taiwan is far more important and meaningful to mainland China than it is to the United States. The Chinese people have strong feelings about Taiwan, while “help defend Taiwan” is not particularly popular in the United States. In short, it would be extremely difficult for the U.S. government to fight a war against a country that is not particularly popular and strategically unimportant, but which is popular and important in that country. That’s why I say we have an imbalance of interests.
Matthew Kroenig: The system that the United States and its allies have built and defended over the last 75 years, I don’t want the United States to lose a war that leads to the end of that order and the rise of China.
Emma Ashford: Perhaps a war around Taiwan could lead to the collapse of the international system. After all, there is plenty of evidence that the U.S. is likely to lose this war and potentially relegate the U.S. to a second-rate power.
Matthew Kroenig: Yes, that’s the importance of the U.S. making the necessary investments to stop the war and win it if necessary.
Emma Ashford: I’m just not convinced that Taiwan is important enough for the U.S. to take that risk. That may be why a recent poll by the Eurasia Group Foundation found that only a minority of Americans believe the United States should “protect Taiwan.”
Sending troops to train Taiwanese troops is an even riskier proposition because they put Americans on the ground, and there is always the fear that future policymakers will use them as so-called “outposts.” And the risk of a specific U.S. commitment to actually “defend Taiwan” is too great.
