According to the analysis, J-20 stealth fighter of China is going to be able to look backwards, and PL-15 missile would be able to shoot down the Patriot missile.
Last week, it was reported that the Russian military had officially purchased the new medium-range air-to-air missile “Product 180”, which was a major modification of the R-77 air-to-air missile. The shape changed and the performance improved significantly. In terms of usage, the statement that “Product 180” can intercept air defense missiles in an all-round way is quite attractive.
If that’s true, then this will be a new “anti-missile” field outside the interception of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles. Similarly, there is air-to-air missile interception, Russian weapons manufacturer has released a schematic of air-to-air missiles shooting air-to-air missiles. In comparison, air-to-air missiles are more difficult to intercept. So, is this new “anti-missile” approach reliable?
The first prerequisite to intercept air-to-air missiles is of course the ability to see. This has been the most difficult part. The most threatening air-to-air missile is the one that flies straightly towards you. And the radar reflection cross-sectional area is only 0.01 square meter, which is equal to a stealth target.
The best aircraft-scanning radar in the 3rd generation fighter (the method still used in China) has a range of 100-150 kilometers for the target of a MiG-21 size, which is roughly equivalent to only 24~36 kilometers for an oncoming air-to-air missile. Therefore, if you want to find air-to-air missiles with the airborne radar in the 3rd generation fighters, it will be like using MiG-21 to find the target in empty air. Moreover, this detection field is limited to ±60 degrees in the first hemisphere. For this reason, the 3rd generation fighters cannot use the radar to make missile warnings, instead they use radar warning device (RWR). However, apart from the final guidance stage of the active guided missile, what RWR caught is not missile itself, but the fire control related signal of missile mounting platform.
Therefore, it can basically be said that the 3rd-generation fighters are usually unable to independently discover the specific location of the air-to-air missiles. Of course, fire control information cannot be obtained.
This problem has been solved after some three-and-a-half-generation fighters. For example, J-10C, Su-35, MiG-35, Rafale, F-35, and J-20 have distributed infrared sensors, and they can discover any short-range air-to-air missiles, and they can reach a maximum distance of 10 to 20 kilometers (especially for air defense missiles, such equipment can reach 50 kilometers for large air defense missiles), and can set 1-class azimuth accuracy to meets the requirements of fire control. Although this purely passive approach does not necessarily set the distance, the distance must be within the missile’s range, so there is a chance to guide air-to-air missiles to air-to-air missiles.
The distance of the anti-AAM (air-to-air missile) allowed by the above-mentioned defense capability is relatively close. In fact, the three-and-a-half-generation and newer fighters still have radar alarms or data links, which can master the possible threat directions and can use more advanced phased array radar to enhance searches for such direction. At this time, air-to-air missiles were found at longer distances, and complete position and speed information are obtained for fire control information.
However, the phased array radar of a typical fighter has a field of view of only ±60°, which means that if it is to deal with air-to-air missiles, unless the incoming air-to-air missile is just in the same direction as the battlefield, it would probably have to give up on its original mission in order to deal with air-to-air missiles. In this way, even if the air-to-air missile is intercepted, its goal is still achieved, while your mission fails.
However, if the radar of the fighter can look “backwards”, then the situation will be different. For example, Su-35 fighter’s main radar field of view can reach ±120°, and when the radar warning device tells that there may be missiles in the distance, without interruption of its mission, the main radar could be used to enhance the search, and the missile detection distance could be much farther.
As Su-57 fighter has used a three-plane radar to detect the “behind” target, Chinese military industry has also revealed a three-plane radar on Zhuhai Air Show, which is believed to be used in the future. Of course, there are inevitably infrared or ultraviolet alarms for the three-face array radar. Under the combined effect of the two, the range of air-to-air missiles could be further improved.
The second prerequisite is whether fire control is available? It is necessary to obtain fire control information after the target is discovered. The speed of the missile is much faster than that of the aircraft, which would cause some problems. If the fire control radar isn’t designed to hit such a fast target, then there is a problem in getting useful fire control information.
After all, the faster the target is, the shorter the time is required for fire control system needs to solve the fire control information, otherwise the calculated fire control information may be “outdated”. This should not be a big deal for the new generation of phased array radars. For example, the Su-35’s Irbis-E radar (Snow Leopard) is designed against hypersonic targets.
The third prerequisite is whether the missile can be shot? Usually each missile has a target speed range for intercepting. Technically, a goal that exceeds the maximum target speed cannot be intercepted (cannot guarantee or cannot be intercepted at all).
The maximum target speed of a short-range missile like R-73 is usually 2200~2500 km/h, which is about 2~2.5 Mach, that means that it can only intercept air-to-air missiles that decelerate to below 2~2.5 Mach. While medium-range air-to-air missile R-77 has a maximum target speed of 3,600 km/h, which is beyond Mach 3.5, only slightly less than the speed of some medium-range air-to-air missiles (about 4 Mach, which is greater than the speed of a large part of air defense missiles). Therefore, unless the missiles are flying at a very fast speed, the incoming air-to-air missiles are usually within the interceptable speed. Therefore, although fourth-generation anti-aircraft missiles such as MBDA Aster and 9M96 can be super-maneuverable, it is not meaningful to discuss the interception here.
Therefore, air-to-air missiles (including air defense missiles) are not unstoppable. To intercept missiles, there are certain requirements for early warning, fire control and missiles. To meet these requirements, from the perspective of aircraft performance, it is necessary to use the J-10C, Su-35, MiG-35, F-35, Rafale, Su-57 or J-20 fighters.
It’s reported that China Air Force’s PL-12/15 missile has been cutting-edge and has the potential to intercept air defense missiles or air-to-air missiles. And as for other matching missiles, Russian-made fighters such as Su-35 and Su-57 have R-77 or “Product 180” missiles and Rafale fighter with “Mica” missile will be more prominent. These two missiles have high target speeds, while AIM-120 and PL-12 also have high target speeds but the extreme situation steering ability seems to be relatively poor, which might affect the interception.
Although air-to-air missiles have been rumored for playing anti-aircraft missiles or air-to-air missiles, in terms of technical conditions, they have only begun to be practical in recent years, and there is still much room for research.
For example, the number of missiles carried by warplanes is limited, so it is of course impossible to use many air-to-air missiles to fight air defense missiles or air-to-air missiles. It is reported that the United States is developing a lighter and cheaper short-range air-to-air missile. If it is completed, the missile carrying capacity would be increased, which could increase the opportunities of such interception operations.
